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w< Ie often hear complaints about the
performance of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. A cogent example is the decade of
the 1970s, when the Federal Reserve
mistakenly and regrettably paid too little
attention to inflation. This mistake cul-
minated in the enactment of the Federal
Reserve Reform Act of 1977, which set
out provisions for reporting to Congress
about economic conditions and mone-
tary targeting.
Even though the Fed has since had
greater success in controlling inflation,
with the rate of price increase hovering
in the 4 percent range for the past six
years, the complaint most likely to be
heard now is that the System is not suf-
ficiently sensitive to the administra-
tion's economic priorities. Moreover,
grumblings from some quarters about
the System's foreign exchange market
operations in partnership with the
Treasury, and about the financial
problems in the banking and thrift in-
dustries, have recently generated
criticism of the System's discount win-
dow operations.
In order to examine these issues, we
must step back a bit and construct a
framework for the discussion. We must
ask ourselves several questions: What
is the justification for central banks?
Why should we have them at all? What
are their costs and benefits, and why do
they need realistic and compatible
goals? Finally, how can they be held
accountable for achieving these goals
without imposing other offsetting costs
on society?
• The Rationale for a Government-
Sponsored Central Bank
Milton Friedman presented a classic
statement of the economic rationale for
the existence of central banks in his
1959 Millar Lectures at Fordham Uni-
versity, subsequently published as
A Program for Monetary Stability.
Professor Friedman's argument appealed
fundamentally to the costs inherent in a
pure commodity-standard system, such
as the gold standard. These costs arise
both from pure resource costs and, per-
haps more significantly, from substantial
short-run price variability resulting from
inertia in the adjustment of commodity-
money supply to changes in demand.
The inefficiencies represented by these
costs are a significant disadvantage of
commodity-money exchange systems.
As a consequence there is a natural ten-
dency, borne out by history, for pure
commodity standards to be superseded
by fiat money. But particular aspects of
fiat money systems—such as fraudu-
lent banking practices, "natural"
monopoly characteristics, and tenden-
cies for localized banking failures to
spread to the financial system as a
whole—have resulted in the active par-
ticipation of government. We have
come to know this active participation
as central banking.
The independence of the Federal
Reserve System within government
ensures that monetary policy is insu-
lated from fiscal policy. Yet, calls for
the central bank to fine-tune the
money supply in response to economic
woes continue to be heard. If the
Federal Reserve were given a clear
legislative mandate to achieve price-
level stability and financial market
efficiency—along with the indepen-
dence and accountability necessary to
realize these goals—maximum eco-
nomic growth would be the result.
These objectives apply to the System's
role in discount window lending and
to its relationship with the Treasury
in the realm of exchange-rate policy.
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lenged, not even by Professor Friedman
himself.' Disruptions in payments can
be costly, but so are the inefficiencies
caused by the lack of an effective
anchor for the price level in fiat money
systems. Moreover, theoretical discov-
eries in the area of finance and mone-
tary economics, closer attention to the
lessons of historical banking arrange-
ments, and advances in information
and financial technologies have con-
tributed to a healthy skepticism about
the superiority of central banks and
government regulation over alternative
market arrangements. For example,
some of the financial backstop func-
tions performed by central banks and
banking regulators may have weakened
private market incentives to control
and protect against risk.
Still, those who would argue for alter-
native monetary structures must at least
recognize that their case rests on un-
tested propositions. Yes, it would be
foolish to accept unthinkingly our cur-
rent central banking setup as the best
solution to problems posed by the crea-
tion and maintenance of monetary sys-
tems in advanced economies. But it
would also be foolish to claim that the
current practice of central banking does
not reflect progress in society's groping
for solutions to those problems.
It is not sufficient to argue that market-
oriented alternatives to our current
central banking structures functioned
better in other times and places; for
example, as they did during the private
banking period in eighteenth-century
Scotland. This begs the question of
why such a system did not prove to be
sustainable. Nor is it sufficient to argue
that this system would have prevailed
if not for government intervention.
This line of debate fails to consider
whether any political equilibrium ex-
ists that would support a market-driven
monetary system in a modern economy.
It is premature to claim that some hypo-
thetical monetary system can, or
should, come to dominate institutional
arrangements that have evolved from
extended political and economic experi-
ence. I believe that the prudent first
course is to seriously consider the
advantages of improving the perform-
ance of the Federal Reserve System.
The benefits of a properly managed fiat
currency are considerable, and the
issue today is, or should be, how to pro-
vide the Federal Reserve System with a
proper charter.
• The Federal Reserve
and Its Charter
Before the creation of the Federal Re-
serve, the country prospered without a
central bank. Broadly speaking, the his-
torical impulse for the Federal
Reserve's creation in 1913 was a series
of banking panics. These panics led to
contractions in money and credit in
various regions of the country, often
with serious consequences for
economic activity. The nation wanted
to improve the functioning of its bank-
ing system by establishing a means for
providing an "elastic money" in the
context of a monetary standard based
on full convertibility into gold. The
gold link was broken considerably by
the Gold Reserve Act of 1934.
The Federal Reserve was bom out of a
compromise between those who would
have kept the banking system entirely
private and those who wanted govern-
ment to assume a prominent role in a
rapidly growing economy. Other nations
have grappled with the same problems
and have created similar institutions.
Today, the Soviet Union and several East-
em European nations are facing these
same issues. We now have a world mon-
etary system in which governments
monopolize the supply and management
of inconvertible fiat monies. Often using
central banks as their agents, governments
also regulate banking activities.
The displacement of the commodity
standard that prevailed at the time our
central bank was founded has exposed
problems not otherwise envisioned in
1913. For example, we have no anchor
for the price level except for that pro-
vided by the Federal Reserve. The
quadrupling of our price level since
1950 suggests that the essential man-
date of the Federal Reserve—to ensure
the viability of our monetary exchange
system by the maintenance of price
stability—is neither as explicit nor as
strong as would be desirable for the
management of a fiat currency. If the
benefits of a fiat currency are to be
achieved without large offsetting costs,
the gradual demise of our convertible
monetary standard will require a basic
change in the framework within which
the Federal Reserve System functions.
The evolution of the global monetary
system reflects a common, even if un-
stated, acknowledgment that the
benefits of a fiat monetary standard are
substantial. Wise administration of that
standard requires a central bank in
some capacity. In this context, the es-
sential issue is how nations can achieve
the benefits of a fiat money standard
and simultaneously constrain the exer-
cise of that power to the service of the
public good. To put it another way,
how can a nation prevent its central
bank from debasing the monetary
standard it is charged to protect, or
from undermining the efficient
functioning of the financial system it is
charged with strengthening?
The answers to these questions can be
found by giving the central bank clear
objectives as well as independence and
accountability for achieving them. The
problems that emanate from multiple
and often incompatible objectives are well
known. To contribute to maximum eco-
nomic growth over time, central banks
must achieve price-level stability and
financial market efficiency. Achieving
these goals requires central banks to be
free from political expediencies.The objectives of the central bank are
substantially determined by its legal
structure. For example, a clear legisla-
tive responsibility to achieve price-
level goals above all others would all
but eliminate potential conflict with
other objectives. The vexing question
of whether, and to what extent, a cen-
tral bank should compromise the objec-
tive of price stability in order to pursue
auxiliary goals, such as smoothing real
output fluctuations or stabilizing ex-
change rates, should be resolved in the
legislative charter.
• Independence and Accountability:
The Case of Fiscal Dominance
The consequences of concentrating
power in a central bank were ap-
preciated, and much debated, at the
time of the Fed's creation in 1913.
Checks and balances were woven de-
liberately and carefully into the fabric
of the Federal Reserve System. A "fire
wall" was constructed between Con-
gress and the executive branch on one
side and the monetary authority on the
other, in order to diminish both the mo-
tive and means to debase the value of
the nation's money. The fire wall was Fed-
eral Reserve accountability for monetary
(rather than fiscal) policy objectives. It
was reinforced by the Treasury-Federal
Reserve Accord of 1951, which served as
a clear statement that the Fed would not
be responsible for solving the federal gov-
ernment's debt management problems.
The institutional structure was designed to
ensure enough Federal Reserve inde-
pendence within the government to carry
out this mandate without interference.
What, then, is the source of tension be-
tween monetary and fiscal authorities?
Because the creation of fiat money
involves an implicit tax on money bal-
ances, the monetary authority is one
source of government revenues (last
year the Federal Reserve System re-
turned nearly $25 billion to the Treas-
ury). For the most part, the long-run
viability of the government's fiscal opera-
tions requires that its real current debt
burden plus the present value of its ex-
penditures equal the present value of
revenues. Thus, if the path of debt plus
expenditures diverges from the path of
explicit tax revenues, fiscal viability re-
quires that the discrepancy be satisfied
by seigniorage from monetary growth.
This scenario is typically referred to as
"fiscal dominance" over the monetary
authority.
The dramatic increases in federal def-
icits in the early and mid-1980s
prompted fiscal dominance believers to
predict the impossibility of achieving
and maintaining inflation rates below
the disastrous levels of the decade's
start. So far, this prediction has not
come to pass. In 1983, the federal defi-
cit was 3.8 percent of GNP, a level far
above the post-World War II average
and nearly equal to the postwar peak
realized in 1975. In the same year, in-
flation as measured by the Consumer
Price Index fell to 3.2 percent, a 16-
year low. As the decade proceeded, the
deficit relative to GNP rose, fell, and
rose again. The inflation rate was im-
pervious to these patterns.
Astute observers might question the
relevance of this period to the fiscal
dominance proposition, because defi-
cits—as they are conventionally meas-
ured—do not necessarily reflect the
government's long-run fiscal opera-
tions. To name just a few of the prob-
lems, the value of long-run government
net liabilities is inherently ambiguous,
the path of future revenues is uncertain,
and the appropriate method of discount-
ing future tax and expenditure flows is
problematic. Although sympathetic to
this view, I am still left with the very
strong suspicion that if any period in
our recent history was ripe for the emer-
gence of fiscal dominance, it was the
last 10 years.
Indeed, as the decade progressed and
the predictions of the fiscal dominance
theory failed to materialize, more
sophisticated variants of the relation-
ship between fiscal and monetary pol-
icy began to find their way into eco-
nomic research. The fiscal authority's
reign over the subservient monetary
authority was replaced by a more sub-
tle and complicated institutional struc-
ture, a world in which fiscal and mone-
tary authorities engaged in a "chicken"
game whose outcome left both parties
less than fully satisfied.
Fortunately, if this analytical frame-
work is accurate, the outcome of such a
contest between monetary and fiscal
policymakers has not yet proven detri-
mental to the U.S. economy. The Fed-
eral Reserve's ability to resist monetiz-
ing the federal debt buildup of the 1980s
has resulted in both lower inflation
and, to some extent, the fiscal reforms
that started with the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings legislation and continued
through last year's budget agreement.
I am not suggesting that we should be
satisfied by the present situation. Infla-
tion is still too high, and whatever head-
way has been made rests on a fragile
commitment to preserving our progress.
We should not forget that inflation in
the past year was about as high as in
1971, when President Nixon imposed
wage and price controls in a misguided
attempt to force the rate down. Reform
of the process for setting fiscal priori-
ties is still evolving and has been large-
ly untested. Considering recent budget
outcomes and projections, it is not easy
to find signs of success. But important
lessons were learned in the 1980s:
Lower inflation means better economic
performance, and better inflation
results can be achieved almost regard-
less of fiscal policy. There is every
reason to believe that the Treasury-
Federal Reserve Accord of 1951 was a
prerequisite for this outcome.
• Clear Objectives and
Where We Lack Them
The fiscal dominance case provides an
important lesson about the need for
clear objectives, accountability, and
independence if our central bank is to
be successful at achieving price stabil-
ity and maintaining the integrity of our
financial system.
Currently, there is some measure of
support for reducing inflation from its
present level. But what can explain a
period such as the 1970s, when infla-
tion spun out of control? The story of
that period is one of mistakes and
wishful thinking by economists andpolicymakers alike, acting on the view
that the Federal Reserve could manipu-
late the nonfinancial economy in pre-
dictable ways to soften or offset the oil
price shocks and to control the busi-
ness cycle. This unfortunate economic
performance would have been avoided
with clear and realistic objectives for
the Federal Reserve. The Fed was not
held sufficiently accountable for
achieving price stability.
Some of the current discussions about
monetary policy and the Federal Re-
serve suggest that the lessons of the
1970s may be fading from our memo-
ries. Calls for lower interest rates or
more rapid money growth are not at all
unusual. More often than not, those
suggestions seem impelled by desires
for more growth, or to offset the prob-
lems of particular sectors of the econo-
my. They seem based on the notion
that there is a trade-off between
inflation and output or employment
that may be exploited by the actions of
the central bank. We learned from the
experience in the 1970s that such a
trade-off does not exist. Instead, higher
inflation only added to uncertainty, dis-
torted resource allocation, and reduced
economic performance below the maxi-
mum sustainable level possible with
price stability.
The System's mandate for financial sta-
bility is also vague, raising some ques-
tions about the role played by discount
window lending in recent bank failures.
The original intent of discount window
lending, as I interpret history, was a
mechanism by which the Federal Re-
serve served as the lender of last resort.
Such lending was understood to apply
to solvent institutions in temporary
need of liquidity. Recall that at the time
of the System's founding, there was not
much of an interbank market for banks
to tap when liquidity problems arose.
National or international capital mar-
kets were also not very prevalent. To-
day, by comparison, open market opera-
tions in well-developed national capital
markets have much greater capability
than in 1913 for providing adequate
financial market liquidity.
As the role of the Fed in the economic
policy arena evolved, so did the use of
the discount window. Until recently,
discount window lending primarily
functioned for so-called "adjustment
assistance," a technical operation asso-
ciated with satisfying required reserve
positions. The recent use of discount
window lending in conjunction with
FDIC-directed operations at failing in-
stitutions is more troubling. Both
houses of Congress are concerned
about the Federal Reserve's use of dis-
count window loans to undercapital-
ized, insured banks. Congress seeks as-
surance that such loans do not provide
an opportunity for uninsured depositors
to withdraw their funds and thus to in-
crease the loss to the receiver should
the bank fail.
Use of the discount window for tem-
porary support of insolvent banks has
resulted in a situation that, at least in
retrospect, appears outside the scope of
the Federal Reserve's intended respon-
sibility. The impulse for these activities
has almost certainly been the belief that
they were necessary to avoid systemic
banking failures. It also makes sense to
me that, if both the FDIC and the
Treasury seek the Federal Reserve's
help, then there are incentives to be a
"team player."
The irony is that, lacking a clear set of
rules and objectives, the Federal Re-
serve's discount window activities can
interfere with its mandate to protect the
efficient and safe functioning of the
payments system. Findings in academic
research, supplemented by some bitter
real-world experience, have brought
into focus the perverse incentives
created by regulatory policies that shift
risk from individual depositors to the
public at large. By focusing on the for-
tunes of individual institutions rather
than on the liquidity of the financial
system as a whole, the lender of last
resort process may very well have be-
come distorted in a way that under-
mines what I believe is the appropriate
objective of the Federal Reserve or of
any central bank: to promote the stabil-
ity and efficiency of financial markets.
Another area in which accountability
and clear objectives remain disturb-
ingly absent is the relationship between
the Federal Reserve and the Treasury
in the realm of exchange-rate policy.
Three of the past five administrations
have, at various times, chosen exten-
sive direct intervention in foreign ex-
change markets to influence the value
of the dollar. Because direct interven-
tion cannot be effective without basic
changes in economic policy, I believe
that the Federal Reserve has, on these
occasions, risked confusing the finan-
cial markets about its monetary policy
intentions. Moreover, although the
System's participation with the
Treasury in foreign currency purchases
and sales has not yet resulted in large
profits or losses, its exposure to loss rises
with the size of its foreign securities hold-
ings. During the past several years, there
have been periods when the System's
holdings expanded considerably.
The Federal Reserve almost always
"sterilizes" its exchange-rate interven-
tions through offsetting domestic open
market operations that leave the net
money supply unchanged. These for-
eign exchange transactions thus do not
compromise the integrity of the Federal
Reserve's price-level objective.
Unsterilized interventions are nothing
more than open market operations con-
ducted through the foreign exchange
market rather than through the U.S.
government securities market. Unsteril-
ized interventions in support of the Treas-
ury's exchange-rate objective could work
at cross-purposes to the pursuit of the
System's price stability objective. Subor-
dinating the goal of price stability to the
Treasury's desired exchange-rate policy
is unlikely to improve economic welfare.
But in the absence of a clear statement of
priority for monetary policy objectives,
the possibility of such a sacrifice cannot
be dismissed.• Conclusion
As I have argued, the institutional de-
sign of the Fed has served the useful
purpose of insulating monetary policy
from the federal government's debt pol-
icy. Recent studies suggest that greater
degrees of central bank independence
from the political process lead to better
inflation performance. In this regard,
legislative attempts to strengthen the
role of the Treasury in the formulation
of monetary policy seem to me to work
in the wrong direction.
The fire wall between monetary and fiscal
policy, capped in 1951 by the Treasury-
Federal Reserve Accord, should be
strengthened by releasing the System
from responsibility for supporting the
Treasury's exchange-rate policies. We
need a Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord
amendment for the twenty-first century.
Finally, preservation of the Federal Re-
serve's role in maintaining financial
market stability requires that we
develop clearer guidelines for discount
window activity. Discount window
lending must be confined to solvent in-
stitutions for the purpose of forestalling
systemic, rather than bank-specific,
risk. Recent congressional attention to
this matter has already resulted in coop-
eration between the Federal Reserve
and the House Banking Committee to
clarify appropriate use of the discount
window when undercapitalized institu-
tions seek loans. The System and Con-
gress can also agree on the need to
close undercapitalized banks promptly,
before they pose undue risk to the
FDIC. To do otherwise could seriously
undermine the discipline provided by
market mechanisms, and in so doing
could hamper the Federal Reserve's
stewardship of the financial markets.
The precise features of changes to the
Federal Reserve System can and
should be debated. Unfortunately,
much of the current discussion about
Federal Reserve independence, by
focusing on the process of selecting
System officials, falls wide of the
mark. Holding the institution account-
able for an explicit objective dilutes the
importance of how system officials are
selected. For a nation to capture the
advantages proffered by central bank
management of fiat money, the central
bank must be held accountable for
achieving price stability. The Neal
Resolution, which mandates that price
stability should be the highest priority
of the Federal Reserve and sets forth a
specific time frame for achieving that
goal, is a good approach.
6 Attaining
price stability is essential for the econ-
omy to achieve its maximum long-run
growth.
Experience around the world and
through time repeatedly demonstrates
that central banks require independence
from day-to-day political life to per-
form their price stability role. If legal
and cultural conditions could be
created that truly fixed a central bank
with accountability for anchoring the
price level, the structure of the central
bank itself would become a less impor-
tant issue. Those circumstances would
be a joy to behold, but I am afraid they
will be some time in coming.
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